A comparison between the judicial review processes in federal Brazil, quasi-federal Spain, and unitary Colombia provides an answer to these questions. Accounting for the differences in the territorial organization and systems of government among these countries, the article assesses the patterns of judicial review originating from the subnational level. Findings suggest that courts affect the interaction between national and subnational politicians in the three country-cases, but through different patterns of judicialization of territorial politics.
Introduction

S
ince the enactment of their most recent constitutions, Brazil, Colombia and Spain have undergone important processes of constitutional judicial review. This article assesses the patterns of judicial review of national legislative initiatives originating from the subnational level, taking into account the differences in the territorial organization and systems of government of these countries.
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The ultimate goal here is to understand how intergovernmental relations relate to the process of judicial involvement in territorial affairs in different institutional settings. More specifically, the article intends to establish a relationship between constitutional judicial review and intergovernmental disputes in the selected countries. With this goal in mind, the article analyzes the instruments used by subnational politicians to challenge policies by the central government. The aim is to show the increasing displacement of conflict to the courts in matters concerning territorial governance. This article does not attempt to explain the decision-making process of judges.
In light of this goal, this article touches upon two pressing questions of territorial politics: how supreme courts have established themselves as pivotal institutions in dispute settlement concerning territorial politics, and how national and regional politicians attempt to use intergovernmental mechanisms to enhance their own interests through judicial review. Considering the differences between Brazil, Colombia and Spain, these questions will serve as a general guideline for understanding two aspects of the judicialization of politics: when plaintiffs bring territorial issues to courts, and how the structure of the judiciary shapes intergovernmental relations.
Judicial inroads into politics are receiving growing attention from scholars. Most analyses focus on the impact of the blurring of boundaries between political and judicial dynamics on democratic development. Analysts indicate that the more prominent role of the judiciary influences political dynamics in different ways: it affects the decision of voters to select political leaders (Fox and Stephenson, 2011) ; it impacts legislative decisions in a competitive political environment (Rogers, 2001) ; it has the potential to work as an insurance mechanism for policy continuity in situations of adverse electoral outcomes (Tridimas, 2010) ; and it fosters political centralization (Vaubel, 2009) . Disputes related to the Legislative branch have been brought before constitutional courts, changing the way in which conflicts have been commonly resolved. Courts are increasingly involved in disputes between central and subnational governments, implying that in territorial politics, courts are having a determining role in conflict resolution.
In an attempt to show the judicialization of territorial governance, I will base the analysis on three countries with different territorial arrangements: federal Brazil, quasi-federal Spain, and unitary Colombia. Although the selected countries show important differences from each other that are not limited to territorial organization (e.g., systems of government, party system, modes of interaction between central and subnational governments, patterns of territorial conflict), they all have common mechanisms for intergovernmental dispute settlement to initiate a process of judicial review. More specifically, they all have in common some institutional features of judicial independence -e.g., autonomy of the judiciary and external appointment by one branch of government -, which has favored bpsr Helder Ferreira do Vale a growing involvement of the courts in territorial politics. However, they present varying structures of judicial review -e.g., constitutional arrangements, actors who can exercise the right of a plaintiff, scope of judicial power, etc. As a consequence, in Brazil, Colombia and Spain, a greater utilization of judicial review as an instrument of conflict resolution has produced different patterns of judicial review.
Why have Brazil, Colombia and Spain been chosen for this study? Firstly, in these countries, the process of judicial review is the result of a democratic choice in critical moments of political transition. In Brazil and Spain, judicial review became an instrument for settling disputes in order to implement democratic constitutions in the aftermath of the transition to democracy. Similarly, in Colombia, the judicial process became an important element for implementing a constitution in the midst of a civil conflict.
Secondly, these countries are conspicuous cases of judicial review in their respective regions. They have become regional leaders in the use of this process. Brazil and Colombia are the Latin American countries in which the courts are most engaged in the judicial review process (Stein and Tomasi, 2006: pp. 83 ). In Europe, Spain has rapidly adopted a strong system of judicial review since its transition (Ginsburg, 2002) , and in the western European context, it has become a notable case of a country in which political disputes often end up in the courts (Guarneri and Pederzoli, 2002) .
In order to show the growing role of the judiciary in territorial politics in Brazil, Colombia and Spain, this article proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it argues that judicial review is in effect a process of constitutional review with important implications for vertical intergovernmental relations in the countries in question. Secondly, it shows that contention over issues affecting territorial governance in Brazil, Colombia and Spain increased due to the reactions of subnational governments to central government policies. And, thirdly, it demonstrates that in the three countries, territorial cleavages over varying issues have increasingly been decided in the courts, indicating the contentiousness of territorial issues and the inability of conventional political channels to resolve certain disputes.
Assessing Constitutional Judicial Review and Intergovernmental Relations
How can judicial review be considered a process of constitutional change? What is the link between constitutional judicial review and intergovernmental relations? In this article, judicial review is interpreted as an instrument not only of law enforcement but also of lawmaking. As such, constitutional review is presented as an interpretative process carried out by means of the mechanism of judicial review. This notion of constitutional review is associated with intergovernmental relations in the following way: in the implementation of bpsr The Judicialization of Territorial Politics in Brazil, Colombia and Spain the constitution, bargaining among intergovernmental actors can lead to contention and to the pursuit of diverging intergovernmental interests, which, in turn, push different intergovernmental actors into pursuing an amendment of the constitution on their own terms.
The above argument is based on a paradigm that interprets the process of judicial review as a democratically and politically constructed process (Graber, 2005) . This paradigm is also built on the idea that the political realm is increasingly judicialized, a phenomenon coined in the expression 'the judicialization of politics,' as Vallinder (1995) has put it. Moreover, for Tate and Vallinder (1995) , this judicialization of politics is correlated with the politicization of justice, and is the reflection of the expansion of the judiciary in modern democracies (Maciel and Koerner, 2002) .
As this article also considers the judicial branch to be an institution of prime importance politically, I suggest that supreme courts have a role that goes beyond the more traditional function of checks and balances among governmental branches. By understanding that processes of judicial review have entered the arena of politics, it is possible to see that courts are institutions exercising the potential function of veto players, policy players and societally representative bodies (Stein et al., 2006: pp. 82 ).
Based on the notion of the judicialization of politics, the definition of judicial review adopted in the article is borrowed from Tate (1995:28) . He defines judicial review as a process of greater involvement by courts and judges in the decision-making behind public policies. This means that the courts are occupying a dominant role in an area that was previously the almost exclusive territory of the legislative and executive branches of government.
By using this definition of judicial review, I assume that the judiciary is vested with the function of constitutional transformation. As the judiciary becomes an active participant in political disputes, it is reasonable to propose that it is competing with traditional institutions in developing and promoting changes in the constitution. This article embraces a broad idea of constitutional change through judicial interpretation, which, as Rasch and Congleton (2006: pp. 324 ) suggest, entails change without any alteration to the actual constitutional text. Thus, the difference between formal amendments and the judicial interpretation of challenges to the law is related to the explicitness of the process. From this perspective, whenever there is no explicit change in the constitution (e.g., constitutional amendment), judicial review can be considered an implicit form of constitutional review.
Broadly defined, intergovernmental relations can be interpreted as a relationship between different levels of government. Although straightforward, this descriptive definition provides little information about the institutional arrangements shaping this relationship or the political context in which this relationship evolves. Considering both of these factors, intergovernmental relations are understood in this article as a range of interactions bpsr Helder Ferreira do Vale between goal-oriented governmental actors belonging to different locations in a territorial network structure. Given the actors involved and the potential for shifting loci of authority, the interaction is oriented toward bargaining.
Based on the above definitions, it is worth explaining how these three central concepts -judicial review, constitutional review and intergovernmental relations -relate to each other. The article establishes the following rationale that links together the terms: in periods following the enactment of democratic constitutions, subnational politicians -who were important engineers of constitutions -attempted to maintain subnational autonomy by fighting any eventual encroachment of authority through judicial review.
Under these circumstances, they started to use constitutionally guaranteed mechanisms to exercise such autonomy. Over time, the settling of disputes had implicitly transformed the constitution. The decisions by courts set a legal framework for the evolution of intergovernmental relations.
This logic is supported by Ginsburg's (2003) insurance argument, according to which judicial review is put in place after a constitutional pact is reached, so that all parties involved in the pact can be assured that, once in power, no individual party will make drastic constitutional changes altering the initial constitutional order.
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This insurance argument is consistent in the cases of Brazil, Colombia and Spain. In Brazil and Spain, for example, the pact reached among political elites during their respective transitions to democracy had to be protected through the courts, as certain parties feared an eventual encroachment of power. Similarly, amid political upheaval in 1991, Colombia engineered a new constitution, which also needed to be protected from eventual encroachment.
In addition to the insurance argument, one can complement the explanation of how in the three country-cases judicial review fits the larger picture of constitutional change with the so-called theory of renegotiation, as put forward by Elkins et al. (2009) . These authors put forward the argument that constitutions can either be entirely replaced or amended. In the latter instance, in which the cases of Brazil, Colombia and Spain fall, depending on the breadth of participation in the phase of constitutional formulation (inclusion), the level of detail (specificity) and the adaptation of parts of the constitutional text (flexibility), the constitution will endure. The durability of the constitution, however, will be achieved through the amendment of its text, which can take the form of explicit change or interpretative change, as previously explained.
Based on these criteria, one can assess these principles of inclusion, specificity and flexibility considering territorial and intergovernmental aspects of the constitutional texts of Brazil, Colombia, and Spain. From a territorial point of view, inclusion in the initial phase of constitutional elaboration sets the foundations for acceptance and implementation of the constitution. In order to become effective in the intergovernmental sphere, the principle of inclusion must take into account subnational territorial interests in the constitution-making phase. These interests were present from the very inception of the constitutional negotiations in Brazil and Spain through political parties. In Brazil, the states and municipalities obtained important concessions (Souza, 1997) . In Spain, the regions are managed in an asymmetrical manner in order to have their voices heard, at the expense of the municipalities (Carrillo, 1997) . Similarly, in the negotiations leading to the promulgation of the 1991 Colombian constitution, the regions (departamentos) gained important political powers (e.g., direct elections for regional governors, right to pass regional legislations). In Colombia, the rural-urban divide, which was a leading issue in the constitutional negotiations (Nielson and Shugart, 1999) , led to the introduction of decentralizing measures.
As far as the principle of specificity is concerned, and the different territorial arrangements between these countries notwithstanding, the Brazilian, Colombian and Spanish constitutions establish responsibilities for each level of government. The Brazilian constitution lists the exclusive responsibilities of the central, state and municipal governments, as well as the shared responsibilities. Similarly, the Spanish constitution specifies the responsibilities of the national, regional and local governments. Although it designed a unitary system of government, the Colombian constitution enshrines the functional responsibilities of the regional and municipal governments.
In terms of flexibility, the right to adjudication is indeed an important sign of flexibility that has been crucial for settling intergovernmental disputes in the three countries. In Brazil, judicial review is exercised through the Direct Acts of Unconstitutionality (Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade -ADI's) and the Declaratory Acts of Constitutionality (Ações Declaratórias de Constitucionalidade -ADC) filed at the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal -STF) .
3 These two instruments are used in abstract matters, but the former is the main mechanism for intergovernmental dispute settlement.
In Colombia, the instrument of judicial review made before the Colombian Constitutional 
Dynamics of Judicial Reviews and Intergovernmental Relations in Brazil, Colombia and Spain
In any federal system a constitutional court helps to define the limits of shared power by settling disputes between levels of government. However, this role of constitutional courts is not limited to federal systems; in unitary systems courts can equally settle disputes between different administrative units. The cases of Brazil, Colombia and Spain show that intergovernmental dynamics in these countries cannot be understood without including their respective constitutional courts as decisive players in territorial politics.
The decisiveness of these courts regarding territorial politics is determined by the pattern behind the initiation of the judicial review and by the main characteristics behind court rulings. In the three cases, data on the challenges for judicial review will shed some light on the main plaintiffs behind the challenges, as well as on the main political patterns behind them. 5 A longitudinal analysis involving all cases concerning intergovernmental conflict in Brazil, Colombia and Spain shows different patterns. In the Brazilian (1988 Brazilian ( -2012 and Spanish cases , the available data concerns the challenges initiated by subnational political actors. 6 In the case of Colombia (1992 Colombia ( -2012 , due to restrictions on publicly available data, the information analyzed was the final rulings of the Colombian CC concerning territorial matters.
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As far as the court rulings are concerned, they are analyzed through "landmark court rulings", which are groundbreaking rulings by the Supreme Court concerning territorial challenges. Identifying landmark court rulings is important for recognizing relevant junctures in the recent history of judicial review in the three countries, and the intergovernmental actors favored by the courts. In Brazil and Spain, the subnational governments were favored in their respective landmark rulings, while in Colombia it was the central government (see Table 1 ). The rulings on the challenges were selected based on the salience of the issue and the impact it had on future territorial related sentences.7 In the following subsections, the main patterns and characteristics of the constitutional judicial review process will be identified in each country-case.
Brazil
The judicialization of politics in Brazil shows that the judicial branch plays an important role in the process of intergovernmental conflict. This role has become particularly noticeable in a context of growing independence of the judicial branch of government (Santiso, 2003) . In Brazil, judicial review is exercised through the ADI's filed at the STF.
Based on the STF's database, state governors are the main users of this constitutional instrument, being responsible for on average 26% of all the unconstitutional challenges brought to the Supreme Court from 1988 to 2012. 8 The other main plaintiff is the group of national union confederations, accounting for 21% of all challenges. The figures on the actors that most resort to judicial review mechanisms suggest that state governors are by far the intergovernmental actor most engaged in judicial review in Brazil (see Figure 1 ).
However, it is important to note that 80% of all of the governors' challenges were against the state legislature, and only 2% against the national executive and 5% against the national legislative branch. Considering that the majority of the unconstitutional challenges in Brazil review legislative measures and that the state governors are the main plaintiff, the judicial review process in Brazil has two main characteristics: it is concentrated at the subnational level and it is mainly an inter-branch conflict. These characteristics indicate that judicial review in Brazil is not dominated by intergovernmental disputes. Yet unconstitutional challenges in Brazil have consolidated as an important institutional mechanism at the disposal of intergovernmental actors. In effect, between 1988 and 2012, the national government presented only 8 challenges to the STF, while the state governors presented 1,140 challenges.
The most important challenges that reached the STF concerned financial matters (Kapiszewski, 2011 in the defense of their autonomy, confirming the observation that municipal autonomy is preserved and defended in Brazil through political review (Araujo, 2005: pp. 26 ).
The evolution of judicial review in Brazil indicates that after the 1988 Constitution the process gained momentum; however, it has been used with more or less the same frequency. This feature is also applicable to the challenges presented by Brazilian state governors (see Figure 1 ).
All things considered, the STF has a tendency to favor the executive branch of government. Early findings also support this claim (e.g., Leoni and Ramos, 2006) . However, caution is needed when interpreting the role of the STF in a broad area such as territorial matters, which encompass fiscal and administrative issues. Fiscal issues represent 60%
and administrative issues 32% of the total challenges of judicial review. As a consequence of the wide range of rulings that fall in the territorial matters category, there are important variations in terms of court rulings. There is nowadays an increasing consensus on the fact that the STF exercises restraint in ruling against the executive (Carvalho, 2004; Oliveira, 2006; Vianna et al., 1999) . However, after looking at the landmark rulings in Brazil, it can be suggested that state governors have exercised their power as veto players in intergovernmental relations through judicial review. This does not mean that the state governors are always successful; rather, it indicates that they meddle in federal policies aided by the STF.
Colombia
Since its creation in 1991, the CC has made important inroads into politics. Over time, this court has become an important institution in the Colombian political arena by bpsr Helder Ferreira do Vale regulating and restricting the presidential power to declare a state of emergency (Uprimny, 2004 (Uprimny, , 2007 , and deciding about the possibility of re-election of the president. The
Colombian judicialization of politics is well documented, especially regarding issues pertaining to the state of exception, as well as human and social rights issues. However, the effects of judicialization on the intergovernmental dimension are overlooked in Colombia.
Although Colombia is a unitary state, its regional administrative units, departamentos, as well as the municipalities, are active entities in the attempt to preserve certain responsibilities. In effect, from 1992 to 2012, over 60 laws dealing with the competencies of the regional administrations were brought to the CC challenging their constitutionality.
Out of this total, only approximately 20 laws were reviewed by the CC. Even though there is no clear pattern in terms of the evolution of the challenges over time, a trend can be observed -most of the territory-related laws have been contested before the CC, but most of the challenged laws never received a verdict. 11 As such, the 297 sentences of the CC concerning territorial challenges from 1992 to 2012 account for less than 2% of the total court sentences issued in this period (See Figure 2) . Despite this freedom to initiate a judicial review, it is important to mention that the CC can strike down any unconstitutional law for substantial and procedural reasons. In effect, all the territory-related constitutional challenges have been either struck down or the final ruling has favored the central government. In short, so far, no challenge concerning territorial matters has been successful in reverting or amending centrally proposed legislation on territorial matters. However, the process of judicial review works as an incomplete process of constitutional review, as the general pattern shows that the CC frequently strikes down the challenges.
This suggests that whereas the process of judicial review concerning territorial disputes is in place and functioning, it fails to review the claims by plaintiffs being brought to the court. Furthermore, while this pattern indicates that the CC does not change the status quo as it fails to produce an adverse effect other than siding with the Attorney General and striking down the challenges. In other words, judicial review in Colombia has a predictable outcome.
Spain
The TC can be considered one of the most important institutions mediating relations between the ACs and the central state (Aja Fernández, 1996:129) . In effect, the In Spain, the type of relationship between central and regional governments has been determinant in the process of judicialization of territorial governance. The proximity of Spanish territorial organization with the vertical federal system creates greater interdependence between central and regional governments. Under vertical federalism, at least in principle, there is greater institutional protection of the interests of constituent units (Halberstam, 2008: pp. 146) . As this predicament does not apply to Spain due to the unfinished nature of the territorial distribution of power in the constitution, the TC became not only the defender of the constitution on territorial matters, but also developed There are several implications behind this mediating role of the judiciary in intergovernmental relations through the supreme courts. Two implications deserve special attention: the fact that courts can be decisive institutions for the intergovernmental balance of power by shaping policies concerning territorial governance; and that they can influence the options and strategies of the national and subnational parliaments and executives.
With regard to the first implication, courts can set the general legal framework of intergovernmental dynamics (Opeskin, 2001: pp. 135 In reference to the second implication, political actors might build their strategies for political influence by considering the judicial review factor. After all, judicial review itself is constrained in some circumstances (Vanberg, 2001) . The process of judicial review, for example, might induce national political actors to engage in strategies to circumvent judicial reviews, such as engaging in amending the constitution, as in the case of Colombia.
Another choice is to use judicial review as a process of constitutional change, which is the case of Spain and Brazil. In the latter case, even constitutional amendments are subject to judicial review.
Evidence of the influence of the courts abounds in the three cases. In terms of the intergovernmental balance of power, the courts have favored one level of government over the other in the long-run (see Table 2 ). Contests the national Organic Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomic Process (LOAPA), which establishes common norms concerning the implementation of the constitutional competencies of the Autonomous Communities.
Pronounces that the LOAPA cannot be enacted on the principle of harmonization and as an organic law. Furthermore, it considers unconstitutional several of its articles (e.g., Articles 1; 2; 3; 4; 5.1, 2 and 3; 7.1 and 2; 9; 10; 22), which, according to the ruling, encroach on the constitutionally guaranteed competencies of the Autonomous Communities.
Subnational
In Brazil, the courts have been decisive on the fiscal front. The STF has increasingly decided on matters involving conflict between the executive and legislative branches at a subnational level, having a tendency to favor the executive branch. In other words, the STF has increasingly regulated subnational matters. In the Colombian case, indirect constitutional change has been felt in the post-constitutional setting up of the hierarchical mode of intergovernmental relations, whereas the constitution initially envisioned a decentralized mode of intergovernmental relations. In the Spanish case, under vague constitutional provisions on the territorial architecture, the courts have been able to establish a doctrine of intergovernmental relations that is notorious for delineating the distribution of responsibilities among the central government and the Spanish ACs.
Further evidence of the courts' lasting impact on intergovernmental relations is that over time they have created a pattern across the cases characterized by a gradual reduction of challenges, following the growing involvement of the courts. In Brazil, after 2005, the challenges brought to the courts by the state governors were substantially reduced. 
Final Remarks and Extensions
This article comes to the conclusion that whereas constitutional judicial review is being used as an instrument for intergovernmental dispute resolution, there are different institutional incentives behind the constitutional judicial review process. This variation in terms of patterns of reviews in Brazil, Colombia and Spain stems from the different institutional constraints influencing the judicialization of territorial relations in these countries.
In the comparison between the three cases, although there are variations in terms of how to file an unconstitutional challenge across the cases (e.g., the decision on whether concrete or abstract, applied a priori or a posteriori of the law enactment, distribution of power over the judicial review process among the supreme court and the subnational courts) there are some similarities among them, namely, the motivations behind the use of judicial review and the sustained role of courts on territorial issues.
In contentious political matters, such as issues involving more than one level of government, the uncertainty of the final outcome of the contention is often difficult to achieve through political mechanisms. In line with the main predictions put forward by Ginsberg 2 It is possible to interpret Ginsburg's insurance argument from a more narrow perspective and apply this argument to transitions to democracy in which the members of the incumbent autocratic regime control the transition process. In such a situation, the courts are envisioned as having the role of protecting the incumbent elites in case they are faced with electoral defeat later on.
3 Other instruments of abstract review include the declaratory action of constitutionality, the direct unconstitutionality act due to omission (ADO) and petition for non-compliance with a fundamental precept. In addition, there are other mechanisms through which conflicts reach the STF, such as through the Extraordinary Appeals (Recursos Extraordinários -REs), which challenge lower court rulings, and the Writ of Mandamus (Mandato de Segurança -MS), both of which are concrete review mechanisms.
4 The Spanish constitution is difficult to amend because there is a requirement of a two-thirds majority in each chamber, followed by dissolution of parliament and ratification by referendum in order to approve an amendment. In contrast, to amend the Brazilian and Colombian constitutions, a lower threshold is required. 
